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Article 3

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAWt
Natural Law is the realization of a momentous possibility:
the possibility that what is highest in the province of legal
and moral thought is also deepest in nature. It is the realization of the possibility that the ideal and the existentially
real can be identified in one single concept of justice, not
merely evanescently in our lives or personal experiences, but
enduringly in the universe itself. From a thorough investigation of this possibility no seriously minded student of the
law should be debarred, no matter what his personal philosophy may be.
In order to gain a true perspective of Natural Law and
its problems, it would profit us to rid our minds temporarily
of all preconceived notions regarding the historically developed and accrued positive law. Many lawyers and jurists,
engrossed in the technicalities of their profession, might
wonder how we could achieve a first hand acquaintance with
Natural Law, unless it be by reference to history and historical texts. For did not the great Windscheid only two generations ago announce in a final intonation that "at last we
have been shaken rather rudely out of a dream called natural
law." (Der Traum des Naturrechts ist ausgetrdumt.)
We, the heirs of a positivistic or realistic law tradition,
steeped in the technical and historical aspects of the so-called
case method, can no longer look to real legal authority. We
have been told by Julius Stone I that even the slender
traditional authority of the common law, the "jurisprudence
of stare decisis," is at best but a wishful thought. Our learned
judges, speaking from the highest tribunal, are bluntly informing us that their decisions are valid for one day and that
t This paper originally was delivered on the occasion of the first Archbishop
Ireland Memorial Lectures on Natural Law, November 28-30, 1950, held at the
College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota.
I Stone, Fallacies of the Logical Form in English Law, in INTERPRETATIONS
or MODERN LEGAL Pirnosorass 696 (Sayre ed. 1947).
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day only. How, then, can we resort to authority, if we are
brought up on what might be called an anti-authoritarian
experimental jurisprudence, already degenerated into a purely experimental "method of social engineering." In a blaze
of pragmatic fervor the advocates of this social experimentation admit that if there is at all such a strange thing
as law and justice, it is at best a crude hit or miss affair,
imperfectly attainable through the mechanical balancing of
equities. We might even use reason as an instrument to find
out something about the law. But, again, we have been told
by philosophers now in fashion that reason is an instrument
to be used most sparingly and only as a means of clarifying
what comes to us by experience - what has been done in
the name of law. And experience
the positive law - itself
has become a tenuous word which today is more elusive than
ever.
-

It is suggested here that above all we should render the
term law in a broader and more profound sense than the
professional legal positivist or legal realist would ever concede. It is further intimated that the term "legal knowledge"
should be interpreted to include a type of understanding
which to some extent is actually outside the rather narrow
limits drawn by the unimaginative legal positivist or legal
realist without thereby becoming "illegal" or irrational. In
other words: we shall attempt here to indicate that Natural
Law is a form of eminently valid legal knowledge or knowledge situation; that like all other forms of valid knowledge,
Natural Law consists of critical judgments organized in
a coherent body of "super-sensorial data"; and that thes
judgments are based on reason and fact as well as the
rational awareness of the existence of values, standards,
or norms. We shall also show that the knowledge situation
which stands for Natural Law is tantamount to the apprehension of self-evident propositions as well as their rationally
cogent implications; and that Natural Law is above all not
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so much the establishment of a particular and limited legal
datum or description of such an isolated datum, but rather
the fuller realization of all positive legal data and their ultimate over-all significance.
It is the purpose of this paper to suggest that Natural
Law is a form of legal knowledge which cannot be restricted,
by a positivistic legal empiricist, to judgments confirmed by
what courts, legislators or administrative agencies actually
do or have done in a given situation. Natural Law implies a
knowledge which includes a systematic understanding of
metaphysics and reason properly employed, as well as an
appreciation of certain objective standards, principles and
norms which contain the possibility for a more profound
evaluation of the totality of all positive laws. And finally,
Natural Law also signifies a type of rational knowledge which
includes an interpretation of the whole world of human
action and human conduct on the basis of these objective
standards, principles and norms.
Although Natural Law at times lacks the detailedness
and particularization of the positive law, like every form
of truly rational knowledge, it presupposes a participation
in fundamental relationships which are reasonable and
hence both universal and necessary. In addition, knowledge
of Natural Law stands for what I would call a basic
"loyalty" to something eminently rational in the domain of
human conduct and human relations. It is loyalty to the
power that works the realization of this rational conduct
and thus brings about these relationships. Hence Natural
Law is also a body of convictions as well as rational conclusions declaratory of the appropriateness of certain intelligent and voluntarist commitments. Such commitments, to
be sure, in their eminence cannot always be verified, empirically, particularly not by those legal positivists or legal
realists who insist on limiting the meaning of the law to
whatever is done officially by the courts, the legislators, or
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the administrative agencies of every politically organized
society. But even the most radical legal positivist or legal
realist cannot really deny that Natural Law, which he
probably would call "a belief," leads to a kind of assurance
which cannot be considered more arbitrary than the positivistic position itself.
With Dean Pound we shall define positive law as the
historically developed and accrued body of basic grounds of,
and guides to, actual decision in controversies. These
grounds and guides are not merely directives for actual
decisions; they are also guides to a definite conduct as well
as the basis for the prediction of possible "official" action.
This body is, at the same time, a highly specialized instrument of social control within an existing organized and
politically developed society. As a matter of fact, this society
operates and carries on much of its business in accordance
with this body of basic materials which are applied in a
judicial or administrative process. Both the administrative
and judicial process, in turn, are nothing other than the
application and development of these basic materials
through the employment of a definite technique. And this
technique itself, like the body of basic materials, must be
understood in the light of historical evolution, taught tradition and certain received socio-political ideals which are
likewise fundamental.
Natural Law, on the other hand, signifies a well grounded
rational understanding of a basic situation, expressed in
rational judgments. It means, at the same time, the intelligent recognition of certain authoritative and objective
norms, standards and precepts of conduct. In this, Natural
Law might even be called a devotion to perfection and to
the power which is at the bottom of this perfection. And
this devotion cannot be otherwise than the expression of an
intelligent attitude devoid of arbitrariness and sentimentality. Natural Law, or the knowledge which is called Nat-
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ural Law, makes definite assertions about values, standards
and relations; as well as about the totality of a given reality
called the existing positive law. But this existing reality the positive law - which is a purely experimental situation,
also claims to be true - a claim which must still be submitted to the approved tests of truth. Obviously, the positive
law cannot test itself as regards this particular claim. Such
an attempt would lead to utter confusion, anarchy and even
lawlessness. For what sincere legal positivist or legal realist
could really tell us which of two decisions is "the correct
one," and which is "the false one?" And still he is somehow
aware that one of these two decisions is "the correct one"
or at least the one he "likes better," unless he would concede,
in a spirit of cynical resignation, that "correct" is whatever
the last and hence technically unimpeachable court of appeals has said in its latest decision. But such a dispirited
surrender to mere "legal do-ism," such a degrading "giveit-all-up philosophy" cannot satisfy and never has satisfied
the more ambitious mind. Hence only a "higher law," the
Natural Law, affirmed and reaffirmed by the loftiest thinkers
of all times, can actually decide the validity of the truth
claim made by positive law.
During the 18th and the early part of the 19th century,
judicial review, for instance, had nothing to do with the
positive law or a written constitution. On the basis of common right and reason it operated in a relationship of semiindependence of the written law. Thus Justice Samuel
Chase, in Calder v. Bull, stated in 1798: 2
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state Legisla-

ture, or that it is absolute and without control. . . . There
are certain vital principles . . . which will determine and
overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power.
• . . The genius, the nature, and the spirit,

of our state

governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid
2

3 DaU. 386, 1 L. Ed. 648, 649 (U.S. 1789).
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them. [To hold otherwise, it was concluded,] would be
political heresy altogether inadmissible....

And Justice Miller, in Citizens' Savings and Loan Association v. Topeka City,' decided in 1874, pointed out quite
emphatically that "it must be conceded that there are...

rights in every free government beyond the control of the
State. A government which recognized no such rights .. .
is after all but a despotism."
We all agree that there is a basic difference between the
mere liking of a thing and the goodness of a thing. To
assert that something is good, is a definite truth claim. It
implies that objective knowledge about goodness is possible.
Now such an affirmation is in itself significant because it
objective standards,
implies the recognition of something'
norms, or principles - which is independent of individual
preferences, likings, or desires. To assert the existence and
validity of objective standards, norms, or principles is not,
as some positivists would make us believe, the discovery of
how individuals feel personally about certain matters. It is,
on the contrary, the discovery and assertion of something
above these experiences of personal emotions; something
which conforms to reason and the dispassionate process of
intelligent argument.
The innumerable revolutions of history show that at all
times men of excellence have resorted to a "higher law"
when they rejected most eloquently a legal system which
could no longer be justified by this "higher law." In doing
this they actually appealed to a higher standard of justice
and right, and to a more perfect and lasting norm of what
constitutes true lawfulness. We might also recall here the
truly great philosophers who have held this truth to be selfevident: that above the bewildering multitude and diversity
of the ever-changing positive law there must exist a higher
unchanging law which in its objectivity is co-eternal with
3 20 Wall. 655, 22 L. Ed. 455, 461 (U.S. 1874).
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absolute truth. And the existence of this higher law is of
crucial importance for man himself. For only in virtue of
this higher law, but never through all the decisions of courts,
acts of legislature, or commands of administrative agencies,
can the true secular excellence of individual man become
manifest and effective. Only through this higher law - the
Natural Law - can the real uniqueness of man's inalienable
and irreducible moral worth and dignity be practically
asserted. We might even say that only through the Natural
Law can man's claim to rationality be fully justified and
hence become of real practical significance. The real advantage of this eternal truth is that, although it seems to
become extinguished at times, in the course of the ages
there have been, and always will be, thinkers of excellence
to assert and re-assert it, until some day its proclamation
falls in a time when under more favorable circumstances
this truth escapes persecution and ridicule. For basic truth
such as this will, in God's good time, make sufficient headway to withstand all subsequent attemipts to suppress it.
Some opponents of the Natural Law might point out
here that it has not theoretical truth as its primary object,
at least not according to their pragmatic conception of
truth. As a matter of fact, the positivist or realist will point
out rather emphatically that Natural Law is not at all concerned with the discovery of truth - that it has not the
detached impartiality which is considered, by the so-called
scientific realist, positivist, or semanticist, an indispensable
part of the truthseeker's attitude. But what does the scientific realist actually mean by truth, that is to say, by his
particular concept of truth? Truth to him is contained in
the following rather meaningless formula: Any assertion
which is not an assertion of fact is not a true assertion; any
assertion of fact which is not based on sense experience is
not a true assertion of fact; any sense experience which
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cannot be verified by scientific experiment is not a true sense
experience; and any scientific experiment which does not
lend itself to quantitative measurement is not a true scientific experiment. But what does all this mean for the problem
of law? Let me suggest here the following answer: In the
light of such a naturalistic view, and in keeping with the
now so prominent faith in "scientific realism," psychologism,
or plain statistical method, the truth meaning of law would
be reduced to a quantitative analysis of glandular secretions,
appetitive droolings, and reflex, random, or artificial
(learned) responses to stimuli. Somehow I feel rather happy
over the fact that the truth situation connected with the
problem of Natural Law does not meet the truth requirements demanded by the positivist or scientific realist.
But even from the rather limited point of view of the
legal realist, Natural Law is a truth method, although essentially an indirect truth method. Let us, for argument's
sake, temporarily assume the position of the legal realist
looking at Natural Law. If, then, the methods of Natural
Law, according to the legal realist or legal positivist, are
so indirect, and if its participation in the truth situation is
incidental to its other aims, is Natural Law not rather poorly
equipped for an adequate comprehension of the practical
legal truth situation? Our answer to this query fundamentally seems to depend on whether or not we are willing to
concede that the methods with which we seek truth are so
complex and often so different from one another that different forms of approach to truth at times become necessary.
As a matter of fact, we shall base our whole argument in
favor of Natural Law on the assumption that the approach
to the truth situation called Natural Law requires a different
method than a purely realistic treatment of the law, commonly referred to as "legal scientism." And in doing this we
shall make every possible concession to the legal realist and
legal positivist.
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If we agree with the positivistic or realistic approach to
law and its many problems, we are forced to admit that the
legal truth situation in general must be defined as a body
of "beliefs" confirmed by sense data and quantitative experiments. If this is really so, then we are unable to make any
truth claims for Natural Law whatsoever. If, on the other
hand, we are willing to concede that there exists a type of
truth situation which we affirm even though its complete
verification by sense data, sense observation and quantitative experimentation is beyond our reach, then a less restricted and hence more fruitful approach to the problem
of the legal truth situation in particular can be established.
Perhaps the most eloquent defense of this broader view on
the legal truth situation is stated by William James himself,
certainly a man whom even the most radical legal realist
and legal positivist cannot completely ignore. In a letter
addressed to Professor Leuba, James makes the following
statement: 4
I find it preposterous to suppose that if there be a feeling
of unseen reality shared by large numbers of best men in their
best moments, responded to by other men in their "deep"
moments, good to live by, strength-giving, - I find it preposterous, I say, to suppose that the goodness of that feeling
for living purposes should be held to carry no objective
significance, and especially preposterous if it combines harmoniously with our otherwise grounded philosophy of
objective truth.

Whenever we are dealing competently with a type of
knowledge such as Natural Law, we are apt to tread on
perilous ground. It appears that the perils of Natural Law
arise from several sources. One peril stems from a shocking
misunderstanding or misconception of Natural Law. Another
proceeds from the unwillingness of some men to face its
demands whenever these demands are opposed to their
prejudices, traditions, interests, or aspirations. These men,
at least outwardly, "accept" Natural Law by professing to
4

R
2 PER Y, THE THOUGHT AND CHARAcTER O

WILLIm

JAMES 350 (1935).
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be its supporters. But actually, in the application of its
principles to social problems, they succeed in undermining
it in the eyes of its adherents and the sceptical. A third
peril to Natural Law arises from the failure to re-apply the
principles of Natural Law to changing conditions and changing needs. This peril becomes particularly serious in times
of crisis or rapid socio-economic change. We may, for instance, falsely identify Natural Law with an established
economic or social system or, on the other hand, we may be
so convinced of the desirability of a new economic order
that we are inclined to abandon the principles of Natural
Law altogether in order to bring about this new social or
economic system. We may even be so misguided about the
meaning of Natural Law that we claim thereby to be setting
up a new and allegedly superior kind of Natural Law.
Hence there seem to be five major difficulties with Natural
Law which we have inherited from the past or which we
have often experienced from the manner in which this problem has been treated by certain so-called experts on the
Natural Law. The first difficulty is caused by a misunderstanding which proceeds from the methods applied by some
of the defenders of Natural Law. This particular defense
overlooks four important factors. First, it is made in behalf
of all manner of conflicting notions not only as to what
constitutes Natural Law itself, but also to what constitutes
"nature." Obviously, not all these notions can be true, as a
mere cursory survey of the different definitions of Natural
Law in the history of Western thought will at once divulge.
This confusion about the meaning of Natural Law becomes
increasingly serious if no satisfactory means of judging and
evaluating all these conflicting definitions as to their real
truth content can be devised. The mere feeling of personal
"psychological certitude" or "psychological assurance" cannot be accepted as a valid truth criterion by anyone. Secondly, the rather crude but frequently encountered efforts to
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identify Natural Law exclusively with property rights at
the expense of human rights at times have actually turned
Natural Law into the handmaid of unrestrained greed and
economic domination. Thirdly, there is always a glaring
incongruity between the notion of a Natural Law which
gives special favors to one while at the same time denying
to others the prerequisites of a minimum of decent human
existence, and the notion of the universal validity of the
Natural Law advanced by the devotees or authors of such
a "preferential Natural Law." Fourthly, the manner in
which this type of "preferential Natural Law" is woven into
the general fabric of legal ideas and the concept of a natural,
that is, universal justice approved by ordinary standards
and arising from common and healthy experiences, has never
been satisfactorily explained.
The second difficulty about Natural Law arises from the
frequently reiterated claim that some men possess what I
would call a mystical experience of Natural Law - an
immediate and personal conviction which supposedly reveals to some select people the "mystery of Natural Law."
In essence this particular attitude towards Natural Law is
merely another form of "special revelation" frequently
claimed by such clairvoyants as Hitler or Stalin.
The third difficulty about Natural Law seems to be
related to the question as to how the principles of Natural
Law could be applied to an existing, that is to say, historically developed socio-economic situation. This acute and
perhaps even crucial problem is often disposed of in a most
perfunctory, not to say callous and irresponsible manner.
The historical complexities of the many economic, social
and moral issues of total human existence thus remain
wholly unrelated to the Natural Law principles professed.
Such an attitude toward Natural Law is clearly one of
shallow generalizations bordering on meaningless and platitudinous equivocations.
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The fourth difficulty comes from an uncritical definition
of Natural Law, coined and employed by people, both in the
present and in the past, who have tried to manipulate
Natural Law and its meaning in order to advance selfish
interests or to defend on an allegedly supernatural basis
what nature and natural reason itself has unmasked as
being indefensible. In their hands it has become a more or
less systematic effort to justify strange practices of somewhat objectionable men trying to use and abuse the loftiest
aspirations of mankind for their own crude purposes. By its
very motives and results this type of alleged Natural Law
stands condemned in the eyes of all intelligent and decent
men.
The fifth and perhaps most serious difficulty must be
recognized in the fact that Natural Law has been invoked,
though falsely, by certain questionable experts on the Natural Law in order to justify, and even glory in, their antiintellectual, anti-progressive and anti-humanitarian bias.
This irresponsible and immoral polity, parading under the
name of Natural Law, h~s done almost irreparable damage
to the cause of Natural Law. It has, in many instances,
alienated from the Natural Law many people of excellence
who, under more favorable circumstances, would have become its most persuasive adherents and spokesmen. Deeply
disappointed with this type of "pseudo-Natural-Law," many
a good legal scholar has either become an avowed opponent
of the Natural Law, or has embraced some form of positive
law which in his opinion would treat more adequately the
pressing social, economic, or political issues of our time.
Not a few people, among them scholars as well as plain
dilettantes, seem to be ready to take Natural Law for
granted. They often go so far as to regard it as something
self-explanatory or even self-evident. There are indeed those
who sing its praises, as there are those who denounce it.
But unfortunately there are only a very few who genuinely
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study and properly interpret it. Whenever we think that
Natural Law, being something self-explanatory or selfevident, needs no competent explanation or special understanding, we are particularly apt to misunderstand or falsify
it completely, as the many and often distressing instances of
platitudinous generalizations and equivocations about Natural Law would indicate. It is truly deplorable that this
thing called Natural Law frequently is not deemed to need
or deserve the patiently painstaking and faithful exercise
of the intelligence we apply to so many other things that
matter to us much less. Here as elsewhere we fail to see the
importance of things we simply, or should I say, naively
take for granted without further thought or effort. But this
alleged familiarity with Natural Law, which is actually
nothing other than complete ignorance or, at best, a grossly
inadequate or distorted knowledge of the meaning inherent
in the concept of Natural Law, may in fact breed misunderstanding and even contempt.
When we fail to realize the meaning and importance of
Natural Law we actually forsake both our heritage and our
future. The need for an intelligent and forceful comprehension of the Natural Law is greatly intensified by the problems of our own time. There are strong challenges from
without, and there is also legal and moral disintegration
within. There are forces at large which, to meet successfully,
we need a strong and clear cut reassertion of the true principles of Natural Law, a solemn revindication of its worth,
and a firm reapplication of its values. We may, as we have
in the past, spring to the defense of Natural Law when it is
manifestly threatened; and we have a vague inkling what
the loss of Natural Law would mean to us. But this sentimental attachment to Natural Law does not suffice for its
survival or salvation. What we need is a positive reassertion
of Natural Law. But in doing so we cannot cling to antique
expressions, outmoded conceptions, or outworn phrases of
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the past. Many advocates of the Natural Law make the
serious if not fatal mistake of limiting both its meaning and
content to thunderous and often ill-advised tirades against
legal positivism, legal pragmatism and legal realism. Such
a purely negative attitude, being totally devoid of any constructive or positive element, neither is apt to make friends
for the Natural Law, nor does it clarify what Natural Law
actually means and for what it stands.
The only way we can bring to life Natural Law is to
translate it anew into the language and institutions of our
time. All values die sooner or later if in a spirit of misplaced
reverence for the past we cling to the formulas of other days.
Hence we must gain a clear conception of the positive nature of Natural Law, its worth and value. In our time in
particular, when Natural Law is subjected to new and
formidable challenges, we run great risks because of our lack
of understanding of what Natural Law actually means.
Since the advocates of legal positivism always take advantage of our compliance and our ignorance of Natural Law,
a thorough understanding of the positive content of Natural
Law should be of particular concern to us.
In a general way the legal positivist and legal realist did
start out with the rather ambitious but never realized claim
that they would establish once and for all the scientific
foundation of legal truth. Putting the emphasis on certainty
and clarity of the law and the positivist legal truth situation
at the expense of its range, they have gradually and progressively restricted the area to which the term "law" and
legal knowledge can be applied. No one, to be sure, will
quarrel with a procedure which, if applied to a limited field
of human understanding and human inquiry, assists us in
distinguishing what from the standpoint of purely experimental knowledge is clearly known, and what is less clearly
known. But this method certainly goes too far when, as a
by-product of this procedure, the domain of the less clearly
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known - less clearly known according to the truth criteria
of the positivist and realist - suddenly becomes the unknowable or not-known, or as in the case of metaphysics
and Natural Law, the "non-sensical." Such practices are
frequently not so much the result of willful design as the
effects of an uncritical abuse of the positivistic or realistic
knowledge processes. Issues and problems which at best
are but dimly perceived by the positivist or realist, and
which do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis or
statistical experimentation, are thus banished in a rather
arbitrary manner from the area of the total truth situation
and simply declared the equivalent of matters which are not
known at all.
A generation of lawyers and jurists, many of them undoubtedly prompted by the most honorable motives, have
looked to legal positivism and legal realism for a scientific
solution to the many complex questions posed by the law.
They expected and, indeed, hoped that scientific legal realism would offer some intelligent solution to the many vexing
problems connected with the law. But they were sorely
disappointed: For the only answer which legal positivism
and legal realism can offer to the problem of law is in fact
the denial of the significance of the problem itself. What
the legal positivist or legal realist can actually supply is
nothing other than a factual description or recitation of decisions, statutes, procedural rules, or perhaps congressional
debates in terms of naive observations or manipulations.
Such a descriptive method has met with full approval by
the physical scientist who, after all, should be permitted to
determine his own methods and procedures as long as he
remains within the restricted area of his own scientific
province. But what might be fully adequate for the purely
experimental physical sciences could be, and probably is,
somewhat inadequate for the solution or understanding of
the many problems arising from the practically significant
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conduct of man. For we might ask here the question whether
this kind of simplicity in the province of knowledge proposed
by the physical scientist is not won at the dire expense of
adequacy in our treatment of the problem of knowledge in
general. If we follow their advice we might gain one method
or procedure of dealing with purely physical or sensate facts,
but at the same time we lose every chance of expanding the
domain of truth and the area of the knowable. Because in
doing this we refuse at the very outset to admit the possibility of such an extension beyond mere sensate experience
and experiment.
At this point we shouid also inquire whether the positivistic or realistic position itself is not confronted with serious
difficulties of its own. Let me enumerate some of these inherent difficulties: The legal positivist or legal realist must
assume without proof the accessibility of the past through
memory; the communication or communicability of ideas,
concepts, or symbols through identical meaning; the consonance of other experiences with his own; the acceptability
of his own hypothetical purpose; the dependability of induction; and the validity of his insight into logical relations as
well as into the connection between initial hypothesis and final verification. All these postulates, on which he bases his
whole method, his procedures, and hence his whole claim to
truth are nothing but "gratuitous dogmas." The exclusive
reliance on actual pronouncements of the courts or acts of
administrative agencies, proposed by the legal positivist or
legal realist, in itself always implies and presupposes, therefore, the assumption of, and reliance on, something more than
these actual pronouncements or acts. And finally, we should
also point out that by his exclusive reliance on these actual
pronouncements or acts, he is forced to assume the existence
of other minds - an assumption which he himself cannot
verify satisfactorily by his own scientific method. But he
must nevertheless make this unscientific and, as a matter
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of fact, totally unwarranted assumption - unwarranted
from his own point of view - in order to justify his own
use of intersubjective language and symbols. This alone
would indicate most glaringly that the legal positivist or
legal realist has already been forced into a strictly defensive
position, unable to carry out his much advertised and loudly
heralded attacks on Natural Law.
It is a common practice of the legal positivist or legal realist to challenge his opponent by inviting him to deal with the
problem of law in a more adequate manner than he does.
And we can accept this challenge with confidence. For is it
not his practice always to assume or presuppose certain
"unscientific" beliefs which, in the final analysis, are necessary to his own method and hence always turn out well
for him? Thus we might point out to him that all these
assumptions actually do not belong within the province of
verifiable sense-experiences and hence are actually outside
the particular truth situation or knowledge situation which
he so jealously tries to establish and defend. This fact alone,
if pointed out properly, in itself should destroy his position.
Let me illustrate this point. The legal positivist or legal
realist will openly scoff at such "bed-time stories" as the
"moral dignity of man" or the "natural rights of man." But
from experience we know that in practice there is hardly a
more eloquent claimant of these rights than the legal positivist who spends most of his time disproving "scientifically"
the very existence or truth of these rights. Since Natural
Law frequently fulfills the latent purposes even of those
individuals who rebel against it theoretically, it seems to
provide also for those who are totally blind to its existence.
Paraphrasing Proudhon and his famous statement we can
say with much assuredness about the positivistic or realistic
approach to law: "Qu'est ce que le droit positif? Le droit
positif c' est le vol. (What is this thing called positive law?
Nothing other than plain theft.)
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Thus the issue between the legal positivist and those who
still adhere to Natural Law would seem to be not mere
juristic experience against a super-experimental understanding of the law, but actually juristic experience plus something more than this experience against super-experimental
understanding of the law. Hence the question which confronts us as well as every honest legal positivist, or legal
realist is plainly this: What does this "something other than
pure experience" consist of, and what does it actually include? This raises at once a further question: Are the data
of positive law in fact purely "positive," that is, purely
empirical? Does the legal positivist or legal realist, in order
to establish his particular legal truth situation or legal
knowledge situation, rely exclusively on empirical data the functions of the courts, legislators, or administrative
agencies? Is it not true that in an experimental science such
as physics there arise different kinds of problems with varying degrees of remoteness from pure sense data and the
procedures of the laboratory? For does not physics frequently proceed systematically rather than experimentally?
In other words: Physics, although it is of course not wholly
independent of sense observation and measurements, requires more than mere observation and quantitative experiment. As a science, that is, as a body of organized knowledge
about a subject, it requires at all times systematization and
organization. But systematization and organization, like
method or procedure, are in themselves not prima facie
sense data based solely on experience. All this suggests in
itself that we should try to strengthen our notion of knowledge in general by acknowledging an abstract truth situation,
instead of allowing it to be weakened and ultimately refuted
by relying simply on one single procedure which is extremely meager at that.
The intelligent person, it seems, is and always has been
rather suspicious of those efforts to establish truth which
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limit themselves to mere sense perception and sense data.
He has consistently denied the existence of a purely experimental truth situation or knowledge situation. At the same
time, in one way or another, he emphatically denies that all
metaphysical assertions are meaningless. He insists that, if
certain assertions made by positivistic philosophers are
provisionally accepted as true, then we should also investigate the assertions made by non-positivist philosophers.
Such a request is only a fair one, unless we are already
agreed upon not to display any impartiality whatsoever.
The metaphysician who insists that Natural Law is preeminently a definite legal truth situation, is able to show
the more profound meaning of the many and at times confusingly complex legal facts. He can also tell us what the
presuppositions are which enable us to deal with these facts
in an intelligent manner. He can show us how Natural Law
is the intelligent and systematic study of the inner structure
of all these legal facts. Although by no means blind to facts
and their relevance, Natural Law is not so much concerned
with facts as with the ultimate meaning of these facts with
a view on justice. And justice, according to Giorgio Del
Vecchio, is one of the fundamental needs of the human
mind.' All this does not mean, however, that Natural Law, if
properly understood, will ignore or discriminate against the
present status of social, sociological or legal theories concerning the derivation and validation of certain ethicopractical judgments or facts. Neither will Natural Law depreciate an empirical explanation of the multifarious experiences that comprise legal controversy, legal adjudication
and law-making. Hence when it is said that Natural Law is
not so much concerned with facts as with the ultimate meaning of these facts, we are merely attempting to indicate
that Natural Law sees in every legal, social, or moral fact
also something which, although it seems to escape the legal
5
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positivist and legal realist, not only enhances greatly the
meaning of this fact, but actually establishes in a certain
sense the authenticity of this fact. For is it not true that
in the domain of practical actuality the significance of a
certain datum for a practical situation is really more important than the mere empirico-factual actuality of this
datum as such?
The whole controversy of legal positivism or legal realism
and Natural Law, therefore, can be reduced to the following
question: Are we actually improving the total knowledge
situation or truth situation by following the positivist position in refusing to permit the term knowledge or truth to
be applied to insights which are the result of analysis or
clarification of a body of given facts? Is it not true that the
legal positivist or legal realist already treads on metaphysical ground when he maintains that the legal truth situation
must be restricted exclusively to whatever the courts, legislators or administrative agencies do?
Natural Law, on the other hand, is more than a mere
refutation of a purely positivistic or realistic treatment of
the law. By implication Natural Law claims that there is a
truth about certain norms, standards, or values which can
be known and which, if properly understood, is true knowledge. It involves the recognition of certain values and
standards which are the foundation of all just laws as well
as the ultimate determinatives of the positive law and our
experience of the positive law. In addition, it is also a more
profound interpretation of the practical or legal universe
in terms of its effective influence on this universe. The legal
knowledge situation, which we shall call Natural Law, actually involves two kinds of what I would like to call
interpretations: First, a general and perhaps emotional experience of value and meaning must be made the object of
critical judgments until it becomes a truly critical and hence
intelligent or rational statement. Such a transformation of
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an unreflective experience into a reflective judgment, of
course, involves the application not only of the formal
principle of consistency, but also the reliance on certain
rational standards which have been tested by the rules of
reason and hence can be accepted by all rational beings.
Secondly, these standards are held to be real and are taken
as having true practical efficacy.
Obviously, such an intelligent attitude constitutes the
real knowledge situation or truth situation commonly called
Natural Law. And the worst we can possibly say about this
knowledge situation is that the evidence which justifies its
acceptance by far outweighs the negative evidence. This
knowledge situation has as its data objective principles
rather than mere sense data or emotional outbursts. Natural
Law and the knowledge situation for which it stands claim
truth for the judicious assertion that the world as a whole,
no less than our total legal experience, furnishes actual support not only for the experience, but also for the existence
of absolute values and objective standards. In this, Natural
Law contributes decisively to the translation of mere hopes
or dreams into the actual realization of what is good, true
and just. It is also declaratory of an eminently decent and
intelligent attitude which continuously asserts that the
standards of right and wrong, good and evil are objectively
real and as such are truly effective in the lives of men. At
the same time, it claims that true, clear and rational statements can be made about these objective and real standards,
and that rational conclusions can be drawn from them. Finally, it implies that any legal knowledge situation which
fails to take account of these standards and their practical
effectiveness, is incomplete and, as such, no true legal knowledge situation at all.
Natural Law, by its very nature, reflects the true dignity
of individual man as a person. By giving expression to
human nature and, hence, to the elementary human interests
and aspirations, it endows man with active as well as passive
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rights which, being consonant with man's nature and ordination, are inalienable. Man is endowed with the power to
assert himself within proper limits and to work out his
own happiness, both secular and eternal. But these active
powers or rights of every human individual do not presume
his independence of other individuals. They do not permit
him to conduct his affairs without concern for the affairs of
others and without regard for the effects his actions may
have upon other men.
Natural Law, by succeeding to make man aware of
fundamental rights, assures him a moral equality in the
exercise of these rights. Under the Natural Law one man's
rights are other men's obligations; and one man's obligations
are other men's rights. Hence no man can claim rights
the exercise of which is demonstrably injurious to another
man. And no man has a right of exploitation. For Natural
Law, properly understood, will never condone man's inhumanity to man. It does not merely establish the liberties
and rights of individual man, but also the liberties, rights
and obligations of social man. It sustains man's claims as a
person. It affirms his quality as a human being. At the same
time, being consonant with the social nature of man, it confronts man with serious social obligations. Hence Natural
Law is not merely a body of rights, often loosely referred
to as the "liberties of the individual." Such a generalization
is both thoughtless and dangerous in that it connotes "rights
in detachment," that is, rights apart from the human community and rights unrelated or even antagonistic to the
common good and the common welfare. It is dangerous in
that it conceives of the individual as existing in a social
vacuum. It is thoughtless in that it completely ignores the
question, so basic to Natural Law, of how far one's liberty
or one's right can co-exist or conflict with other liberties and
rights; and how far certain liberties or rights of some individual may be adverse to certain liberties and rights cherished by others, or even to the elementary needs of life
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itself. For Natural Law, being declaratory of a practical
order, is by its very nature the great and eternal restraint
imposed on all men by virtue of their humanity. Because
of the failure to perceive this, a gross and often vulgar
individualism has frequently paraded itself as Natural Law
or natural rights. There exists, however, an alarming confusion concerning the relation of Natural Law and human
equality, a confusion which is but an aspect of the even
more serious confusion concerning the inter-relation of
Natural Law, the common good and individualism.
Natural Law, by assuring all men of certain fundamental
rights, also assures them of a moral equality in the exercise
of these rights. Now it is claimed that men cannot exercise
their natural rights effectively unless they are equal in all
other aspects as well. This claim is justified to a degree, and
then only if the problem of limitations is clearly understood.
For beyond certain limits equality and liberty may become
opposed to one another in that the passion for equality can
destroy liberty. Any attempt to achieve absolute equality
would most surely result in regimentation or totalitarianism
in one form or another.
The kind of equality which is most clearly in harmony
with Natural Law is the equality of opportunity in order
that all men may develop their natural gifts and talents
for their own advantage and the service of the common
good. This equality of opportunity, proclaimed by the Natural Law, is based on the realization that man has his
irreplaceable worth and his irrepressive dignity. By conferring as well as declaring the equal dignity of all men,
it actually combines opportunity with dignity - the opportunity to realize one's own moral nature and thus live
in accord with one's own moral dignity. By the same token,
it requires the removal of all those insidious inequalities
which frustrate the fulfillments men are capable of - inequalities which arise from the unequal hazards of life,
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from privilege, and from historically evolved tyrannies of
man over man, and group over group.
The real issue, therefore, is whether we should not abandon the rather narrow and, hence, misleading notion that
law exists only on the level of a restrictive experience of
tangible legal events and positive actions by the appropriate
organs of existing society. Quaintly enough, we all seem to
agree, some on a rational, some on a sentimental or emotional basis, that certain legal truths or legal values are of
universal validity, irrespective of whether they are put into
effect or complied with by the courts, legislators, or administrative agencies. These ultimate legal values, which serve
as objective standards, norms and precepts of human conduct, both individual and social, are the eternal greatness
of the law manifest in the passage of temporal laws.
Natural Law as such does not merely indicate where
new legal facts can be discovered, but frequently it also
discloses these facts to the inquiring mind. On certain occasions it strikes vigorously and decisively into the world of
positive law, for instance when the dignity of man and the
deep significance of democracy is shown to be an essential
element of a social situation. Natural Law, in addition,
signifies a growth not only in the knowledge of the law, but
also in the understanding of the ultimate meaning of the law.
Hence the significant relation of Natural Law and positive
law may perhaps be defined as follows: The closer a legal
situation is to the essential aspects of human existence,
the clearer becomes the evidence of Natural Law. It is here
that we encounter the basic guarantees of life, liberty, freedom to engage in a lawful calling, and freedom to pursue
our happiness. But the more contingencies are involved in
a definite legal situation, the greater will be its positive
legal determination through the proper agencies of existing
society. Natural Law, in addition, signifies a growth not
only in the knowledge of the positive law, but also in the
understanding of the ultimate meaning of all positive laws.
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To heed the call of Natural Law is to find out more about
the Natural Law. And in doing so we shall achieve a more
profound understanding of what Natural Law means as a
moral force throughout the world. The result of such a
response to the call of Natural Law can frequently be observed in the general deportment of those who have made
Natural Law an essential part of their lives.
The knowledge of Natural Law simply implies the intelligent acceptance of certain absolute and objective
standards for conduct and thought. In addition, it involves
an interpretation and understanding of law and justice in
terms of the existence and power of these standards. Hence
we might suggest that the term knowledge used in this
connection, should be applied to that type of commitment
which is typical of all intelligent men whenever they hold
that there, must be something comfortingly true, good and
stable about the law, above mere sentiment, opinion and the
bewildering conduct of courts, administrative agencies, or
ambitious scholars. Natural Law and the legal knowledge
situation which Natural Law involves, calls upon the highest
intellectual considerations in the domain of law and justice.
As such it never over-reaches the intellect, but merely points
out a realm of intelligent reflections where the ultimate
significance of law and justice is eternally domiciled.
Natural Law, then, is truly the acceptance of a momentous possibility - the possibility that what is highest in
the province of legal or moral thought is also deepest in
nature. And from the acceptance of this possibility we
should not be debarred.
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